ABSTRACT In this paper, we provide two types of pattern matrices for the diffusion layer P, both can be used as classification criteria for the substitution-permutation network (SPN) structures: if the pattern matrices of distinct SPN structures are equal, then these structures may have the same impossible differential (ID)/zero correlation linear hull (ZC) and the same differential/linear active S-boxes. We introduce some interesting properties of the pattern matrices. Applying our results, we arrive at several interesting facts. First, all the SPN structures with MDS-type diffusion layers fall into the same class and have the same ID/ZC/minimum number of active S-boxes. Second, we provide several interesting properties of pattern matrices and build the links between the P-layer and that after several popular operations. Finally, we investigate the properties of pattern matrices for bit shuffles, the pattern matrices keep the same if and only if the n-partition characteristics of them are equal. Our results are helpful in the designing of block ciphers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Block ciphers have evolved to be the basic primitives of symmetric-key cryptography. Many efficient cryptographic constructions can be built upon them, such as stream ciphers, MACs, hash functions, etc. Block ciphers process a far developed analysis toolbox including the sound linear cryptanalysis [20] , differential cryptanalysis [2] , impossible differential cryptanalysis [1] , truncated differential cryptanalysis [17] , zero-correlation cryptanalysis [8] , etc.
Most of these cryptanalysis consist of two steps. Firstly, the attackers try to find some distinguishers, that is, some statistical estimations of information leakage (e.g. differential characteristic with high probability, linear approximation with high bias, etc). Then, after gaining a list of plaintextciphertext pairs, the attackers guess some subkey materials involved in the outer rounds of the distinguishers and recover these subkeys. Thus in order to get the resistances of a cipher against some cryptanalysis, we only need to take measure of the distinguishers in most cases.
Among all these cryptanalysis, some cryptanalytic results closely depend on the choice of the S-boxes, the most sound examples are the linear cryptanalysis and the differential cryptanalysis. It is also remarkable that some other cryptanalytic results are independent of the choices of the S-boxes, as is pointed by [23] , in impossible differential (ID for short), zero-correlation (ZC for short), etc., we do not really need to consider the details of the S-boxes. Generally, if we replace the S-boxes in the cipher, the corresponding cryptanalytic results will remain almost the same. And in the work of Sun et al. [23] , such kind of S-box-independent cryptanalysis are unified with the name structure cryptanalysis. In recent years, these structural cryptanalysis tools threaten many block ciphers [7] , [10] , [16] , [24] - [27] , and many efforts are focusing on finding the links among them.
A. RELATED WORKS
Blondeau and Nyberg [5] analyzed the link between differential and linear cryptanalysis and established new formulas between the probability of truncated differentials and the correlation of linear hulls. This link was later applied in [4] to provide an exact expression of the bias of a differential-linear approximation. Moreover, they claimed that the existence of a zero-correlation linear hull is equivalent to the existence of an impossible differential in some specific cases. And Blondeau et al. [3] proposed a more practical relation between these two distinguishers for Feistel-type and Skipjack-type ciphers.
Sun et al. [23] provide the links between ID and ZC distinguishers. A dual relation among structures is established. The structure is defined as a set of block ciphers which have the same components except that the S-boxes can take all possible bijective transformations. For a given SPN cipher, we can deduce the structure E SP by a fixed P-layer and all possible bijective S-boxes. The dual structure builds a pointto-point relationship of ID and ZC between different SPN structures. An r-round truncated ID a → b holds iff a → b is an r-round truncated ZC of E S(P T ) −1 .
By Bing Sun's results, we can predict the property of one cipher by detecting its dual cipher. However, we have noticed an interesting fact: if two ciphers have the completely same truncated IDs and ZCs, we cannot always declare that they belong to the same, or its dual structure. This indicates that there may still exist wider similarity-relationships among SPN structures. Inspired by this spark, we will focus on the classification problem of SPN ciphers.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION

1)
We provide two types of pattern matrices of the Player, which can be used to classify the SPN structures. Two distinct SPN structures within the same class have the same ID/ZC and the same differential/linear active S-boxes. 2) We provide the LDE property and prove that two P-layers are LDE means that they have the same pattern matrix, thus the LDE property could be used as a classification criteria of P-layers from the point of view of ID/ZC/DC/LC attacks. 3) Applying our results, we prove several interesting facts.
Firstly, all MDS matrices are LDE, thus all the SPN structure with MDS-type diffusion layers could be classified into the same class, and having the same ID/ZC/minimum number of active S-boxes. Secondly, we provide several interesting properties of pattern matrices and build the links between the P-layer and that after two popular transformations. Finally, we provide an easy-to-use description of pattern matrices for bit-shuffles.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the notations and concepts that will be used throughout the paper. Section III proposes the concepts of two types of pattern matrices. Section IV focuses on the LDE property of the SPN structures. Section V provides two properties of type-2 pattern matrices. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. BASIC DEFINITIONS Symbols in this paper.
wt(X ) the number of the nonzero components of vector X ∈ F m 2 n ; ⊕ the bit-wise XOR operation; , + the addition over real number space;
the cardinal number of set •; GF(2 n ) finite field with 2 n elements; {0, 1} n the n-dimension binary vector space; φ the empty set; M (i) the i-th column of matrix M .
SPN Cipher: Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) structure is a direct realization of the concept of confusion and diffusion introduced by Shannon to protect ciphers against statistical cryptanalysis. A classical SPN cipher is a kind of block cipher that alternatively iterates a substitution and a word-oriented linear transformation (usually with a good branch number). Such good examples are the famous block cipher AES [12] , PRESENT [6] , ARIA [18] , PRINCE [9] , etc.
The substitution layer S is a non-linear transformation on {0, 1} mn defined by m parallel non-linear bijections s 0 , · · · , s m−1 map on n-bit word, i.e.
S(x
the permutation layer P : {0, 1} mn → {0, 1} mn is a linear bijection, and one round SPN structure is defined as
where k = (k 0 , · · · , k m−1 ) is the subkey.
B. DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR HULL
is said to be the correlation of the linear approximation
is said to be a ZC, denoted by a → l b. The result of [23] indicates that the linear approximation of the P-layer (defined as the matrix multiplication y = P × x) a → l b could be transformed into the differential behavior a → d b of y = (P −1 ) T × x, thus we only interest in the differential behaviors of the structures.
C. VECTOR AND PATTERN
Definition 3 (χ-Function):
is said to be the pattern of (
The ID and ZC distinguishers are often given in a truncated way, which means that we only need to detect whether there is a difference (or a mask) in an S-box or not, regardless of the actual value [22] , so we define the truncated ID and ZC by making use of the χ -function.
D. STRUCTURE AND RELEVANT CRYPTANALYSIS CONCEPTS
Definition 5 [23] (Structure):
2 be a block cipher with bijective S-boxes as the basic non-linear components. A structure E E on F mn 2 is defined as a set of block ciphers Eąä which is exactly the same as E except that the S-boxes can take all possible bijective transformations on the corresponding domains.
is said to be a truncated ID (ZC) of f , if for any α a, β b,
is said to be a truncated differential (linear hull) of f .
2) BRANCH NUMBER
The differential branch number and the linear branch number of an mn-bit linear diffusion layer f (x) = P × x are defined as
respectively.
3) ACTIVE S-BOXES
In traditional differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis for a concrete SPN cipher, if
then the probability of differential characteristic and correlation of linear characteristic are respectively bounded by p n d and q n l , in which n d and n l denote the minimum number of differential and linear active S-boxes respectively. Hence the concept of active S-box plays an important role in giving a provable security for the SPN structure [15] .
Once the S-boxes in an SPN cipher are fixed, then the number of active S-boxes is somehow S-box-related. However, under the framework of structure, the S-boxes can take all possible bijective transformations, which means for any α, β ∈ F n 2 \{0}, we can find a bijective S-box s such that
is a nontrivial truncated differential of P-layer} and n l = min{ 0≤i≤r−1 wt(y i ) : y i y i+1 is a nontrivial truncated linear hull of P-layer}, and the number of differential and linear active S-boxes of any concrete cipher within this structure are bounded by n d and n l respectively.
III. TWO TYPES OF PATTERN MATRICES FOR DIFFUSION LAYER
Since the proposal of structure removes the influence of the nonlinear S-boxes of a cipher, the only essential that affect the ID/ZC/active S-boxes property of SPN structure is the behavior of difference/linear correlation patterns bypass the diffusion layer P. More precisely, we are only interest in detecting whether there is a difference in an S-box or not, regardless of the concrete value.
For 2-round of SPN structure E SPS , if we can collect all the output difference patterns for any input difference patterns bypass the diffusion layer P and record them in a table T , we can search out all the IDs of E SPS . Consequently, the idea of finding IDs for longer rounds in SPN is quite simple: exhausting the input difference pattern, for each choice we may predict all of the output difference patterns according to the table T , yielding the set of input difference pattern of the second round. Then, the output difference patterns of the second round could be predicted again via checking the table T . This process continues until the output difference patterns fulfill the whole space F m 2 \ {0}. Since both the input/output difference patterns have 2 m choices, we use a 2 m × 2 m matrix to record the difference pattern behavior of P: the i × j entry of the matrix denotes the number of (possible) differential pairs satisfying the truncated differential i → j (in binary). This leads the pattern matrices.
Definition 7 (Pattern Matrix PM):
2 \{0}, then we define the type-1 pattern matrix by y) : x i, y j and P × x = y}. VOLUME 6, 2018 and type-2 pattern matrix by PM 2 (P) = (e i,j ) 2 m −1×2 m −1 by
The two types of pattern matrices describe the pattern behaviors of the P-layer, and could be very helpful in analyzing the ID/ZC/active S-boxes properties of (r + 1)-round SPN structure E S•(P•S) r :
Proposition 1 [11] : (r + 1)-round truncated ID a → b exists iff (PM 2 (P)) r a,b = 0 ; Proposition 2: The lower bound of differential active S-boxes is calculated by
Thus once we have PM 2 (P 1 ) = PM 2 (P 2 ), then E S•(P 1 •S) r and E S•(P 2 •S) r have the same behaviors of truncated impossible differential and minimum number of differential active S-boxes. Similarly, if PM 2 ((P
By all these means, having the same type-2 pattern matrix could be treated as a criterion in classifying SPN structures. Our goal is to provide some easy-to-check conditions of this criterion.
IV. LDE and TYPE-1 PATTERN MATRIX
According to its definition, if PM 1 (P 1 ) = PM 1 (P 2 ), then we get PM 2 (P 1 ) = PM 2 (P 2 ). Thus in this part, we will focus on an equivalent description of type-1 pattern matrix for P-layers in SPN.
A. LINEARLY-DEPENDENCE EQUIVALENT
Definition 8 (LDE):
Definition 9 (Vector-Cover): Let α, β ∈ F m 2 be two nonzero vectors, if α OR β = α and α = β, then it is said that α covers β, denoted by β α.
Theorem 1: Let P and Q be two m × m invertible matrices over GF (2 n 
the solution space of the equation
can be divided into the solutions within different patterns covered by (i|j) and the zero [21] , i.e.
thus the value of d(P) i,j is associated with the rank distributions of the subsets of
By Eq.(1), we have
Q.E.D. Lemma 1 [19] Proof: By using Lemma 1 we trivially conclude this result.
Q.E.D.
B. LDE AMONG MDS MATRICES
The most attractive diffusion layers are those with maximum branch numbers, which are called MDS diffusion layers. The common approach to construct them is to extract MDS matrices from MDS codes. These diffusion layers have matrix representations over GF(2 n ). Many famous ciphers use this design strategy to construct their diffusion layers, e.g. AES [12] , PHOTON [13] , LED [14] , etc. For MDS matrices over GF(2 n ), we arrive at the next interesting result.
Theorem 2: Let P and Q be two m × m MDS matrices over GF(2 n ), then PM 1 (P) = PM 1 (Q). 
= m, thus we end the proof.
Q.E.D. Notice that if P is an MDS matrix, then both P −1 and P T are MDS matrices. Therefore, we obtain the following Theorem.
Theorem 3: Let r be a positive integer, E S•(P•S) r and E S•(Q•S) r be two SPN structures. If
3) The least count of differential active S-boxes of
E S•(P•S) r and E S•(Q•S) r are equal; 4) The least count of linear active S-boxes of E S•(P•S) r and
E S•(Q•S) r are equal. The Theorem above shows that in the set of all SPN structures, under the viewpoint of impossible differential/ zero-corollary/minimum number of active S-boxes, those structures with MDS-type diffusion layers could be classified into the same class.
V. SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ON TYPE-2 PATTERN MATRIX
By checking the LDE properties of matrices P and Q, we can check whether PM 1 (P) = PM 1 (Q) or not. If the equation holds, we definitely have PM 2 (P) = PM 2 (Q). If PM 1 (P) = PM 1 (Q), unfortunately, we find no proof that it indicates PM 2 (P) = PM 2 (Q). So in this section, we will concentrate on the properties of type-2 pattern matrix.
A. DIAGONAL MATRICES AND SHUFFLE MATRICES OPERATES ON THE P-LAYER
Observation 1: Let P and Q be two m × m matrices over GF(2 n ), if there exist two m × m diagonal non-singular matrices 1 and 2 , such that
Proof: Notice that PM 2 (Q) i,j = 1 means there exist x, y ∈ F m 2 n \{0}, such that χ(x) = i, χ(y) = j and y = Qx hold at the same time. By y = Qx, we have 1 
is a possible differential of P. Notice that both 1 and 2 are diagonal non-singular matrices, we have χ(x) = χ(
On the other hand, if PM 2 (P) i,j = 1, we have Q = −1
2 , by the same way, we arrive at PM 2 (Q) i,j = 1.
Observation 1 indicates that for an SPN structure E SPN , even we exchange the P-layer P into 1 × P × 2 , all of the structural properties can still be reserved. Note: When S is defined over F 2 , it is called a bit-shuffle. When S is defined over GF(2 n ), it is called a word-shuffle.
Let
be a maping, and We assume that the coordinates of all the nonzero entries in word-shuffle S are (0, π(0)), (1, π(1)),· · · , (m−1, π(m−1)), where π is a bijection over Z /(m).
At the same time, the i-th component of
Observation 2: Let P be an m × m matrices over GF(2 n ), S m×m is a word-shuffle matrix, then PM 2 (P) i,j = 1 is equivalent to PM 2 (S ×P) i,ψ(S)×j = 1, and is also equivalent to PM 2 (P × S) ψ(S −1 )×i,j = 1.
Proof: Firstly, we will prove that PM 2 (P) i,j = 1 iff
If PM 2 (P) i,j = 1, then there exist x, y ∈ F m 2 n \{0}, such that χ(x) = i, χ(y) = j and y = P × x. Accordingly, we get the equation VOLUME 6, 2018 which implies
If PM 2 (S × P) i,ψ(S)×j = 1, notice S −1 is also a shuffle matrix, then by P = S −1 × S × P, we get PM 2 (P) i,j = 1. Secondly, we will show that PM 2 (P) i,j = 1 iff PM 2 (P × S) ψ(S −1 )×i,j = 1.
Using the same symbols in the first phrase, when
When PM 2 (P×S) ψ(S −1 )×i,j = 1, using P = P×S ×S −1 , we end the proof.
Q.E.D. The result given above indicates that if we have already get PM 2 (P), then PM 2 (S 1 × P × S 2 ) could be achieved within few computational cost.
Example 2: Take consider of the diffusion layer of AES [12] , i.e. MC•SR. The MC layer is consists of 4 parallel MDS matrices, for each MDS matrix it is quite easy to compute the pattern matrix. Combine these separated pattern matrices together, we get PM 2 (MC). Notice that the SR layer is indeed a word-shuffle matrix, then by Observation 2 we get the pattern matrix for the whole diffusion layer.
B. TYPE-2 PATTERN MATRICES OF BIT-SHUFFLES
In order to save the hardware cost, some lightweight block ciphers employ bit-shuffles as their P-Layers, since they can be implemented by wiring and do not cost any hardware gates. Bit-shuffle has been employed by many lightweight block cipher, typical example is the lightweight block cipher PRESENT [6] . In this part, we move on to figure out the type-2 pattern matrices of these Players. Our results could be summarized by the following Theorem.
Theorem 4: Let S and T be two bit-shuffles acting on mn-
Proof (Sufficiency): Let the input pattern of S be 0 ≤ i = ⊕ t k=1 2 I k ≤ 2 m − 1, then the output patterns forms the set
Notice that S is a bit-shuffle, then the Hamming weight of each column/row is 1, consequently, for any l columns
In the above equation, for (a
This indicates that at least, the n×n partitions of
Without loss of generality, we assume that the coordinates of the rest nonzero partitions at the I k -th partition-column are
By ψ(S) = ψ(T ), the coordinates of nonzero partitions in T at the I k -th partition-column are J 1 × I k , J 2 × I k , · · · , J wt(j k ) × I k , J wt(j k )+1 × I k , · · · , J R × I k . We assume that the nonzero coordinates of the entry '1' at the I k -th partition column of T is (π (nI k ), nI k ), (π (nI k + 1), nI k + 1), · · · , (π (nI k + n − 1), nI k + n − 1), then we construct a n-bit vector (b (Necessity): When PM 2 (S) = PM 2 (T ) , without loss of generality, we assume that ψ(S) i 0 ,j 0 = 1 and ψ(T ) i 0 ,j 0 = 0. Then we consider the input pattern 2 j 0 , since ψ(S) i 0 ,j 0 = 1, we can find such x 2 j 0 that χ(S × x) i 0 = 0, while for T , we get χ(T × x) i 0 = 0 for any choice of x. This contradicts to PM 2 (S) = PM 2 (T ).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we mainly focus on the classification problem of SPN structures.
Our results indicate that both the two types of pattern matrices PM 1 and PM 2 could be treated as classification criteria of SPN structures. More precisely, if two structures have the same pattern matrices, it means they have the same impossible differential distinguishers, zero-corollary linear hull distinguishers and the same differential/linear active S-boxes. The results presented in this paper not only allow to achieve a better understanding and classifying for both SPN structures and the P-layers, but also provide some new insights with respect to the ID/ZC/DC/LC cryptanalytic approaches.
The two types of pattern matrices are the essential points in the evaluation of security margins of an SPN cipher against various cryptanalytic tools, and our results can be helpful in designing a block cipher from the point of view of these attacks.
Finally, we need mention that in this paper, we failed in finding a direct way to get PM 2 for an arbitrary diffusion layer, thus a more efficient algorithm for PM 2 will left for future work.
